OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF
GOVERNMENT
David Hume
Rendered into HTML and text by Jon Roland
Editing
and additional notes based on that of Eugene F. Miller
in Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects
(cité par Pierre Bourdieu, Méditations pascaliennes, Seuil, Collection Liber, 1997, Points, 2003, P.257, aussi in Sur l'Etat. Cours au Collège de France 1989-1992, Raisons d'agir/Seuil, 2012, p.257-258)
NOTHING appears more surprizing to those, who consider human affairs
with a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are governed by
the few; and the implicit submission, with which men resign their own
sentiments and passions to those of their rulers. When we enquire by what means
this wonder is effected, we shall find, that, as FORCE is always on the side of
the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is
therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends
to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free
and most popular. The soldan of EGYPT, or the emperor of ROME, might drive his
harmless subjects, like brute beasts, against their sentiments and inclination:
But he must, at least, have led his mamalukes, or prætorian
bands, like men, by their opinion.
Opinion is of two kinds, to wit, opinion of INTEREST, and opinion of
RIGHT. By opinion of interest, I chiefly understand the sense of the general
advantage which is reaped from government; together with the persuasion, that
the particular government, which is established, is equally advantageous with
any other that could easily be settled. When this opinion prevails among the
generality of a state, or among those who have the force in their hands, it
gives great security to any government.
Right is of two kinds, right to POWER and right to PROPERTY. What
prevalence opinion of the first kind has over mankind, may easily be
understood, by observing the attachment which all nations have to their ancient
government, and even to those names, which have had the sanction of antiquity.
Antiquity always begets the opinion of right; and whatever disadvantageous
sentiments we may entertain of mankind, they are always found to be prodigal
both of blood and treasure in the maintenance of public justice. There is,
indeed, no particular, in which, at first sight, there may appear a greater
contradiction in the frame of the human mind than the present. When men act in
a faction, they are apt, without shame or remorse, to neglect all the ties of
honour and morality, in order to serve their party; and yet, when a faction is
formed upon a point of right or principle, there is no occasion, where men
discover a greater obstinacy, and a more determined sense of justice and
equity. The same social disposition of mankind is the cause of these
contradictory appearances.
It is sufficiently understood, that the opinion of right to property is
of moment in all matters of government. A noted author has made property the
foundation of all government;[1] and most
of our political writers seem inclined to follow him in that particular. This
is carrying the matter too far; but still it must be owned, that the opinion of
right to property has a great influence in this subject.
Upon these three opinions, therefore, of public interest, of
right to power, and of right to property, are all governments
founded, and all authority of the few over the many. There are indeed other
principles, which add force to these, and determine, limit, or alter their
operation; such as self-interest, fear, and affection: But still
we may assert, that these other principles can have no influence alone, but
suppose the antecedent influence of those opinions above-mentioned. They are,
therefore, to be esteemed the secondary, not the original principles of
government.
For, first, as to self-interest, by which I mean the
expectation of particular rewards, distinct from the general protection which
we receive from government, it is evident that the magistrate's authority must
be antecedently established, at least be hoped for, in order to produce this
expectation. The prospect of reward may augment his authority with regard to
some particular persons; but can never give birth to it, with regard to the
public. Men naturally look for the greatest favours from their friends and
acquaintance; and therefore, the hopes of any considerable number of the state
would never center in any particular set of men, if these men had no other
title to magistracy, and had no separate influence over the opinions of
mankind. The same observation may be extended to the other two principles of
fear and affection. No man would have any reason to fear
the fury of a tyrant, if he had no authority over any but from fear; since, as
a single man, his bodily force can reach but a small way, and all the farther
power he possesses must be founded either on our own opinion, or on the
presumed opinion of others. And though affection to wisdom and virtue in
a sovereign extends very far, and has great influence; yet he must
antecedently be supposed invested with a public character, otherwise the public
esteem will serve him in no stead, nor will his virtue have any influence
beyond a narrow sphere.
A Government may endure for several ages, though the balance of power,
and the balance of property do not coincide. This chiefly happens, where any
rank or order of the state has acquired a large share in the property; but from
the original constitution of the government, has no share in the power. Under
what pretence would any individual of that order assume authority in public
affairs? As men are commonly much attached to their ancient government, it is
not to be expected, that the public would ever favour such usurpations. But
where the original constitution allows any share of power, though small, to an
order of men, who possess a large share of the property, it is easy for them
gradually to stretch their authority, and bring the balance of power to
coincide with that of property. This has been the case with the house of
commons in ENGLAND.
Most writers, that have treated of the BRITISH government, have
supposed, that, as the lower house represents all the commons of GREAT BRITAIN,
its weight in the scale is proportioned to the property and power of all whom
it represents. But this principle must not be received as absolutely true. For
though the people are apt to attach themselves more to the house of commons,
than to any other member of the constitution; that house being chosen by them
as their representatives, and as the public guardians of their liberty; yet are
there instances where the house, even when in opposition to the crown, has not
been followed by the people; as we may particularly observe of the tory
house of commons in the reign of king WILLIAM.[2] Were the members obliged to receive instructions
from their constituents, like the DUTCH deputies, this would entirely alter the
case; and if such immense power and riches, as those of all the commons of
GREAT BRITAIN, were brought into the scale, it is not easy to conceive, that
the crown could either influence that multitude of people, or withstand that
overbalance of property. It is true, the crown has great influence over the
collective body in the elections of members; but were this influence, which at
present is only exerted once in seven years, to be employed in bringing over
the people to every vote, it would soon be wasted; and no skill, popularity, or
revenue, could support it. I must, therefore, be of opinion, that an alteration
in this particular would introduce a total alteration in our government, and
would soon reduce it to a pure republic; and, perhaps, to a republic of no
inconvenient form. For though the people, collected in a body like the ROMAN
tribes, be quite unfit for government, yet when dispersed in small bodies, they
are more susceptible both of reason and order; the force of popular currents
and tides is, in a great measure, broken; and the public interest may be
pursued with some method and constancy. But it is needless to reason any
farther concerning a form of government, which is never likely to have place in
GREAT BRITAIN, and which seems not to be the aim of any party amongst us. Let
us cherish and improve our ancient government as much as possible, without
encouraging a passion for such dangerous novelties.
1. [Probably James Harrington (1611-1677), author of
the Commonwealth of Oceana (1656), who maintained that the balance of
political power depends upon the balance of property, especially landed
property ]
2. [During the period from 1698 to 1701, the House of
Commons, under Tory control, opposed measures taken by William III for the
security of Europe against Louis XIV of France. When the county of Kent sent
petitioners to London in 1701 to chide the House of Commons for its distrust of
the king and its delay in voting supplies, the petitioners were arrested.
Public disgust at the treatment of the Kentish petitioners was expressed in a
Whig pamphlet called the Legion Memorial (1701). The Kentish
Petition and the Legion Memorial proved that popular feeling was on
the king's side in this struggle with the Commons.]
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